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Summary
The EU represents a new and complex political system which, according to 
numerous social scholars, suffers from the so-called democratic deficit. The ba-
sic argument behind this claim is that citizens lack control of the EU because, 
within its political system, national parliaments of member states possess only 
limited powers which have not been adequately compensated through steady 
empowerment of the European parliament (EP). Starting from this notion, the 
paper will explore the application of various concepts of democracy within the 
political system of the EU. First and foremost, it will analyse representative de-
mocracy in the EU, which stands as a foundation of all contemporary democra-
tic systems. However, the paper will not stop at representative democracy, but 
it will also look at participatory, direct and deliberative democracy as applied 
within the political system of the EU. These concepts of democracy can only be 
viewed in relation and as an addition to representative democracy, but their ap-
plication is very important for the EU due to limited possibilities for developing 
representative democracy at the supranational level. The paper will argue that, 
with regard to participatory and deliberative democracy, the EU can be viewed 
in many respects as a showcase for the national level, because it successfully 
developed various mechanisms related to implementation of these concepts. 
Particular attention will be paid to the Lisbon Treaty, which clarified many un-
certainties that previously burdened the application of democracy within the 
EU. It will be argued that with the Lisbon Treaty the classic argument about the 
EU’s democratic deficit lost some of its appeal, because this treaty transformed 
the EP from secondary to equal participant in the EU’s legislative process.
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Introduction 
The EU represents an extremely complex political system with no fixed representa-
tives, no government and opposition, no hierarchy of norms, and with continuously 
changing rules of the game, which makes it difficult to define, analyse or evaluate 
(de Sousa /Moury, 2009: 4). For Jo Shaw, the EU is a “polity-in-the-making”, be-
cause its democracy remains both a conceptual problem and a practical challenge, 
requiring multilevel and multi-actor solutions that are “beyond the state”, and per-
haps also beyond the conventions of western-style representative liberal democracy 
(Shaw, 2000: 291). However, even if we accept that the EU represents a “polity-in-
-the-making” and an entity “beyond the state”, it can never be absolved from com-
parisons with the nation state because, apart from the nation state, we simply do not 
have anything else to measure democracy with. The inevitability of comparing the 
EU with the nation state will be taken as a framework for the analysis in this arti-
cle. Theoretically, this approach is much in line with Simon Hix’s conception of the 
EU’s institutional structure being more similar to the modern nation state then to an 
international organisation, which makes it prone to be researched by using methods 
traditionally developed for researching nation states (Hix, 2006: 334). 
The purpose of this article is to analyze how democracy is applied within the 
political system of the EU. The analysis is to show that, despite being a “polity-in-
-the-making”, the EU managed to develop both the representative concept of 
democracy – cornerstone of all contemporary democratic systems – as well as 
its supplemental concepts of participatory, direct and deliberative democracy 
(Holzhacker, 2007: 261). The development of democratic concepts as such does not 
remove the claim about the EU’s democratic deficit due primarily to shortcomings 
of representative democracy at the supranational level. Namely, as pointed by Peter 
Mair, the scope for meaningful input and, hence, for effective electoral accountabi-
lity is very limited, and the EU appears to have been constructed as a safeguarded 
sphere, protected from the demands of voters and their representatives (Mair, 2005: 
9). However, the situation somewhat improved with the coming to force of the Lis-
bon Treaty, which strengthened the EP. Still, the question how the EU can improve 
its democratic legitimacy remains unanswered, and the aim of this article is to seek 
answers to this problem.
Representative Democracy 
Representative democracy is founded on powerful normative ideas such as delega-
tion, conditionality and equality. Although there is a wide range of institutional 
models of representative democracy, in the centre of all of them is the institution of 
parliament, as an institution to which the people acting as political equals in elec-
tions delegate political power on a conditional basis. Therefore, parliaments can 
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claim to represent the people and to effectively embody popular sovereignty (Crum, 
2005: 455). The concept of representative democracy is tightly connected with the 
nation state phenomenon, and the difficulty in transposing representative demo-
cracy to the EU level stems from the fact that the EU is not a state and will probably 
never become one. As pointed by Richard Bellamy and Alex Warleigh, the demo-
cratic legitimacy within the EU cannot be obtained by modelling its institutions on 
those of the nation state, because the scale is wrong, the institutions are wrong, and 
the demos is wrong (Mair, 2005).1 Still, when thinking about representative demo-
cracy, there is no escaping constant comparison with realities bound with the nation 
state because, from a historic perspective, the idea of democratic representation has 
been implemented in practice only within that framework. 
Institutions through which the concept of representative democracy has been 
transposed at the EU level are primarily the EP and the national parliaments of the 
member states. Starting with the EP, it must be emphasized that, as an institution 
bearing direct democratic legitimacy from the European citizens, in the past 20 
years its powers have been gradually enhanced more then those on any other EU 
institution. However, powers of the EP still look weak when compared with those 
given to parliaments at the national level. The EP is not divided into position and 
opposition, there is no government that depends upon its support, it does not have 
the right to initiate new legislation, and most importantly, unlike the national par-
liaments, the EP is not the only institution involved in the adoption of new legisla-
tive acts. These acts need to be initiated by the European Commission, and later on 
adopted by the Council of Ministers and the EP. The complex institutional structure 
of its legislative branch motivated Alex Warleigh to conceptualise the EU as tradi-
tional bicameral legislature, while, in the same line of argument, Ludger Helms ar-
gues that the EP represents an institutional embodiment of parliamentary opposition 
at the EU level (Warleigh, 2001: 85; Helms, 2008: 215). 
An additional weakness of the EP when compared with parliaments at the na-
tional level is the relatively underdeveloped party cohesion of its multinational par-
ty groups. Despite the established system of party whips, party coordinators and the 
institutionalised opportunity to expel a member from the party group, direct control 
of the party groups over their members remains comparatively weak (Helms, 2008: 
221). One of the biggest obstacles in achieving EP party group cohesion has to do 
with the MEPs nomination procedures, which fall under the jurisdiction of the na-
tional parties and not of the EP party groups or the Europarties. Furthermore, the 
comparative institutional weakness of the EP has to do with diminished possibili-
ties for making party politics, because in numerous areas where creation of an EP 
1 Mair (2005) cites Bellamy/Warleigh (2001: 10).
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position has to be reached by the absolute majority of the MEPs votes, two major 
EP groups have been constrained at finding common positions. 
Although it cannot be disputed that the legislative competences of the EP still 
do not match those given to the national parliaments, the Lisbon Treaty in particu-
lar enhanced the EP’s importance through various changes that were brought to 
decision-making processes. First of all, it proclaimed the co-decision procedure, 
whereby the EP and the Council of Ministers equally share their legislative pow-
ers, as the ordinary legislative procedure (TEU, Article 34). This means that, as a 
rule, the Council of Ministers needs to work with the EP as equal legislator in pro-
ducing European legislation. Secondly, by abolishing the pillar structure of the EU 
and submitting the area of judiciary and police cooperation to the legislative pro-
cess known as the community method, the scope of the EP jurisdiction has been 
enhanced. Therefore, the Common Foreign and Security Policy remains largely iso-
lated as the area where the EU makes decisions based on the methods of interna-
tional cooperation. 
The integration-related loss of powers of the member states’ national parlia-
ments has long been designated as one of the main causes of the perceived EU’s 
democratic deficit. Namely, it has been observed that in the process of European 
integration democratic institutions of the national parliaments lost powers which 
were insufficiently compensated by the powers of representative institutions at the 
European level (Crum, 2005: 454). Through different phases of the integration pro-
cess, national parliaments used their right to question decisions of the members of 
their governments in the EU institutions. However, in practice the level of control 
and coordination between national parliaments and national representatives in the 
Council of Ministers and the European Council varied greatly from one member 
state to the other (Auel/Benz, 2007: 64). Furthermore, even in the most promis-
ing cases of cooperation between national parliaments and national representatives 
in the EU institutions, international cooperation as such tends to compromise par-
liamentary control. While parliaments normally have the possibility to enter into 
negotiations over the terms of the legislation proposed and to decide on amend-
ments to it, when it comes to international agreements, their options are very limi-
ted (Crum, 2005: 458). Finally, when dealing with control of international coopera-
tion, all national parliaments are faced with the so-called “efficiency-responsibility” 
dilemma, which implies that too great of a restriction imposed on representatives of 
national governments narrows down the manoeuvring space which is needed during 
negotiations with governments of other countries (Auel/Benz, 2007: 70). 
The national parliaments of the member states represent an integral part of the 
EU political system. They usually ratify new treaties, but they also provide a source 
of legitimacy for members of the Council of Ministers and the European Commis-
Butković, H., How is Democracy Applied within the EU: Combining Elements...
31
sion. Still, the role of national parliaments has not been sufficiently clarified in the 
treaties which preceded the Lisbon Treaty. One of the greatest achievements of the 
Lisbon Treaty is the strengthening of the role of national parliaments in the Euro-
pean legislative process. According to Article 12 of TEU, the EU institutions have 
been obliged to: forward draft legislative acts to the national parliaments, notify 
the national parliaments about applications for accession to the Union, include na-
tional parliaments in inter-parliamentary cooperation with the EP, include national 
parliaments in some procedures within the framework of the area of freedom, secu-
rity and justice, and include national parliaments in the revision procedures of the 
founding treaties. Furthermore, according to the Protocol on Subsidiarity and Pro-
portionality attached to the Lisbon Treaty, with one third of the votes allocated to 
the national parliaments, during a period of six weeks they will be able to register 
their objections against any European legislation in progress which in their view 
breaches the principle of subsidiarity. 
Applying the representative concept of democracy in the EU does not stop with 
the EP and the national parliaments, because the states are also represented by their 
representatives in the Council of Ministers and the European Council. According to 
Christopher Crombez, this indirect kind of representation is based on the legitimacy 
of the second level of delegation. Namely, the European citizens are represented in 
their national parliaments, which support the governments that represent state in-
terests in these EU institutions (Crombez, 2000: 114). Although there are obvious 
problems with regard to the Council of Ministers (which is composed of ministers 
of the EU member states) as a genuine legislative actor, the leading legislative role 
of this institution cannot be denied (Helms, 2008: 214). In fact, it can be stated that 
the Euro-optimistic “dream” of the EU’s federalization, whereby the EP’s powers 
would gradually be enhanced to match the parliamentary powers in the national set-
ting, has been scattered away by persistent refusal of member states to scale down 
the legislative competences of the Council of Ministers. In spite of strengthening 
the EP, the expansion of the co-decision procedure provided by the Lisbon Treaty 
did not jeopardise the Council’s legislative role. Moreover, it can be argued that 
co-decision strengthened the role of the Council as well, because all legislation de-
cided upon in the Council through co-decision has to be adopted with the qualified 
majority and not with unanimity, as was the case sometimes within pre co-decision 
procedures. 
Participatory Democracy
While the idea of representative democracy in its core defends the view that direct 
citizen participation in policy-making processes is not essential to democracy and 
that citizen participation should be limited to voting for leaders and producing a 
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government, the theories of participatory democracy see participation as more than 
voting in elections (Saurugger, 2007: 386). Defenders of participatory democracy 
attempt to go one step further than voting and other conventional forms of demo-
cratic practice. They try to create a space for additional forms of political activi-
ty that could be helpful in returning to the basic promises of democratic life. The 
goal is to introduce political activism in the areas that were traditionally considered 
non-political domains of social life, such as working environments, households and 
schools (Terchek/Conte, 2001: 165). Benjamin Barber is one of the most impor-
tant theoretical scholars advocating participatory democracy within his concept of 
“strong democracy”. He notes that to participate means to create a community that 
governs itself, and to create a self-governing community means to participate. His 
theory implies transformation of the “masses” into “citizens” via education for citi-
zenship. Such transformation should ultimately result in popular preferences be-
coming a principal factor in the forming of government policies (Terchek/Conte, 
2001: 176).2 The popularity of ideas of participatory democracy is strongly related 
to contemporary tendencies in political life, where the emphasis on party politics 
becomes less appealing and effective, while alternative forms of decision-making, 
including judicialisation, expert decision-making, and reliance on non-majoritarian 
institutions, win greater prominence and acceptance (Mair, 2005: 25). 
For Mary Kaldor and Ivan Vejvoda, there are two kinds of democracy. Firstly, 
there is “formal democracy”, which is not primarily about active participation by 
citizens, but rather about providing legitimate leadership and mechanisms to choose 
between rival candidates for public office. Secondly, there is “substantive democra-
cy”, which gives centrality to an active civil society and widespread public partici-
pation in political life. In the case of European integration, as argued by the authors, 
we need to consider whether “formal democracy” is sufficient, and, if not, how best 
to combine it with “substantive democracy” (Kaldor/Vejvoda, 1999: 3-4). It is need-
less to stress that conceptions of “formal” and “substantive democracy” coincide 
with more widespread notions of representative and participatory democracy. 
Promoters of European integration always emphasize the importance of par-
ticipatory democracy for the EU. This view stems from an understanding that the 
development of representative democracy at the EU level will always be hindered 
by the size of the EU, and the inexistence of a European language community, a Eu-
ropean demos and a united public sphere. Still, the insistence on participatory de-
mocracy and its main component – the transnational civil society – is more strategic 
than it seems at first. Being part of an extremely small bureaucracy, the Commis-
sion officials often lack the necessary detailed expertise and knowledge of sectoral 
2 Terchek/Conte (2001: 176) cite Barber (1984).
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practices and problems. Therefore, the fact that the Commission (and, for the same 
reason, the EP) promotes openness towards organized civil society is primarily due 
to its own limitations (Hix, 2005: 228). As a consequence, organized civil society 
has the opportunity to change the direction of a policy at any point in the legislative 
process, from pre-legislative preparation through submitting amendments during 
legislative adoption, even to post-adoption implementation (Hix, 2005: 237).
However, the constant interaction between organized civil society and the EU 
institutions is slow, opaque and unpredictable. Without a dominant executive actor, 
such as a president or a governing political party, to serve as the ultimate arbiter, 
any well-connected group of interests can block a policy initiative (Hix, 2005: 231). 
The absence of clear regulation seems to reinforce a situation in which groups pos-
sessing financial and social resources are privileged, whereas small associations, be 
they civic or small business groups, are not heard in the consultation process (Sau-
rugger, 2007: 393). Furthermore, according to one perception, civil societies organ-
ised at the level of the EU and at the national level represent introverted circles that 
in most cases have only weak links to the other level. On top of that, the horizontal 
links between national representatives are even weaker, which creates an obstacle 
to building a stronger common position and identification with the organization as 
a whole (Tomašič/Rek, 2008: 412). Still, despite all of its minuses, some practices 
such as publishing pre-legislative green and white papers or regulation of lobbying 
activities, promote the EU as a showcase for development of participatory demo-
cracy at the national level. This is particularly true for the countries of continental 
Europe, especially France, where the spirit of the French Revolution still suppresses 
all intermediary bodies between the citizens and the state, fearing a reconstitution of 
the ancient régime’s guilds and the development of factions distorting the general 
will (Saurugger, 2007: 389).
The participatory concept of democracy was included in the Lisbon Treaty un-
der the special article dealing with democratic principles (TEU, Article 11). There 
it is stated: that the EU institutions have obligations towards European citizens and 
their associations, and that they must adequately present their views in all areas 
of Union activities; that the EU institutions must maintain open, transparent and 
regular dialogue with associations and with the civil society in general, and that 
the Commission has the obligation to proceed with broad consultations with all in-
terested parties in order to assure coherence and transparency of actions. Through 
this treaty article, the mechanisms of participatory democracy at the EU level have 
been given a framework through which, ultimately, the complaint about the absence 
of clear regulation in this area could be undermined. Furthermore, it must be em-
phasized that many years before the coming to power of the Lisbon Treaty, the EU 
started to produce different codes of conduct intended to regulate the relationship 
between its institutions and the organized European civil society.
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Yet whatever is being done, the problem of representation remains a weak 
point within the whole idea of participatory democracy. According to Oliver de 
Schutter, the representativeness of civil society organizations remains a highly dis-
puted concept prone to all sorts of manipulations. The question is how to measure 
representativeness. Is it to be measured only through quantitative criteria or through 
qualitative criteria as well, and if the latter is true, then through what criteria exactly 
(de Schutter, 2002: 209). Furthermore, due to the problem of representativeness, it 
is clear that the organized civil society at the EU level can contribute to higher ac-
countability of the EU’s institutions only in a specific way, less through enhancing 
the political engagement of citizens and linking them to political institutions than 
through mutual control of different societal actors that can foster greater transpa-
rency of the political process (Tomašič/Rek, 2008: 405). Keeping all these factors in 
mind, one must not forget that the participatory concept of democracy can only be 
viewed as an addition to representative democracy, and that its capacity to substitute 
for the weaknesses of representative democracy is therefore limited. 
Direct Democracy3
In the reality of modern states, direct democracy represents all constitutional and 
other regulations through which citizens can directly decide upon and create a politi-
cal agenda by voting (Kost, 2008: 10). When compared with representative demo-
cracy, direct democracy seems to incorporate much better the idea of “government 
by the people”. Therefore, direct democracy is perceived today more as a “medicine 
with by-products” than as the “ambit for demagogy” (Schmidt, 2008: 350). How-
ever, it needs to be underlined that in contemporary circumstances direct democracy 
does not represent some independent concept of democracy, but instead a concept 
which is institutionally bound with representative democracy. Furthermore, direct 
democracy can clearly be distinguished from participatory democracy. Namely, 
while participatory democracy is focused on the process of public will formation and 
the idea of civil society, which operates also in non-political spheres, direct demo-
cracy is focused on citizens deciding directly on some specific political topics (Kost, 
2008: 12). The spread of mechanisms of direct democracy among democratic states 
is very uneven. On the one hand, we have so-called “referendum democracies”, such 
as Switzerland, and on the other there are democratic states where the development 
of direct democracy is constitutionally hindered (Schmidt, 2008: 336).
Although for the most part not included in the Lisbon Treaty, or into any pre-
vious treaty, direct democracy still plays a quite significant role within the political 
3 The statistical data on referendums held in the member states on EU matters are primarily col-
lected from Hug, 2002.
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system of the EU. It has mostly been implemented through referendums on EU mat-
ters held by the member states according to their own constitutional requirements, 
although there are other mechanisms, such as a citizen’s petition to the European 
parliament. The referendums can broadly be divided into referendums about mem-
bership in the EU, and referendums on acceptance or revision of the treaties (Hix, 
2005: 196). However, when analyzing over 50 referendums held on EU matters in 
the past decades, the most prominent feature is their unequal distribution between 
member states. Statistics show that approximately one third of all referendums held 
on EU matters in the EU member states were held in Ireland and Denmark, which is 
directly connected with these countries’ strict constitutional requirements.
When discussing referendums about membership in the EU, it must be under-
lined that there is a long list of member states which never called their citizens to 
the possibly most important EU-related referendum, the one about their own coun-
try’s membership in the EU. Such a referendum has never been held in the six coun-
tries which founded the EU: France, Germany, Italy, Luxembourg, Belgium and 
the Netherlands. Furthermore, such a referendum never took place in a number of 
newer member states: UK, Greece, Spain, Portugal, Cyprus, Bulgaria and Romania. 
Finally, citizens of the former GDR have also never been asked about membership 
in the EU. Keeping all this in mind, it comes as a surprise that two referendums on 
EU matters have been held exclusively in two regions with special status within 
the existing member states. One such referendum was held in Greenland as part of 
Denmark in 1982, and the other in the Finnish Åland Islands in 1994. At the refe-
rendum held in Greenland, the citizens decided not to be part of then still EC, which 
automatically led to Greenland’s exclusion from all rights and obligations which 
applied to Denmark as a member state. The negative outcome of the Greenlandic 
referendum resulted in the first and only example of leaving the EU. 
Referendums on revision of the treaties have been implemented since 1986, 
when both Ireland and Denmark called their citizens to vote on the Single European 
Act. The results of both referendums were positive and, in the following period, 
these two countries called up some other referendums on new treaty revisions. Un-
til 2005, referendums on treaty revisions followed a predictable pattern. Namely, if 
the result of a referendum was negative, some minimal changes were made in the 
new treaty and a new referendum was called up on the same matter. However, this 
practice had to be abandoned in 2005, when both French and Dutch citizens turned 
down the European Constitution. Unlike such cases in the past, both France and the 
Netherlands represent countries with a large number of citizens, and count among 
the founding states of the EU. For this reason, the Constitution had to be abandoned 
altogether, while its contents have been largely incorporated into the newly-formed 
Lisbon Treaty. 
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The uneven spread of referendums on EU matters among member states is a 
reason for concern, because it leads to a critical imbalance between different mem-
ber states which, ultimately, can be viewed as an imbalance of rights between Eu-
ropean citizens’, nationals of different member states. One way of fighting the im-
balance of citizens’ rights within the EU political system is through promotion of 
instruments of direct democracy at the level of the EU as a whole. A step in that 
direction has been made with the so-called citizen’s initiative in the Lisbon Treaty 
(TEU, Article 11), which stipulated that by collecting at least a million signatures 
from the European citizens from a “significant number of member states”, citizens 
as such could incite the Commission to make certain legislative proposals. On the 
theoretical level, the idea of EU-wide referendums has been elaborated by Philippe 
Schmitter, who envisaged the insertion of a certain number of referendum questions 
on EP election lists. The content of these questions would need to be determined 
beforehand by the absolute majority of MEPs or by the citizens themselves through 
collection of the required number of signatures. According to the author, the imple-
mentation of EU-wide referendums would bring the EU closer to its citizens, and it 
would motivate politicians to formulate EU regulations in a way that is more under-
standable to an average citizen (Schmitter, 2000: 37). 
On the one hand, the strong side of direct democracy, in principle, is its capa-
city to enable citizens to “jump over” the political class which can be ideologically 
blinded. On the other hand, the main shortcoming of this democratic concept lays 
in its openness to potentially dangerous simplifications which can pave the way for 
populist manipulations (Bale, 2008: 195). However, when talking about the EU, 
these two arguments, conceptualized from the perspective of a nation state, cannot 
be viewed as equal due to the complex supranational character of the EU, which 
greatly enhances the danger of populist manipulation with the citizens. Not only is 
the concept of direct democracy in its theoretical origins, which go back to Rous-
seau, strongly connected with small communities, but the overall lack of the citi-
zens’ knowledge about the EU also does not speak on behalf of its unrestrained im-
plementation at that level. 
To conclude, in the future it would be favorable for the development of the 
EU’s democracy if the application of direct democracy on matters concerning it 
could be limited to some crucial and fundamental questions such as entering and 
leaving one’s own country from the EU. Furthermore, it would be favorable if the 
application of direct democracy regarding EU matters could be regulated in treaties, 
not forgetting equal rights for European citizens. This of course is easier said then 
done, because it would probably require constitutional changes at the level of mem-
ber states. However, it is worth keeping in mind, since uncritical use of referendums 
on EU matters can be detected as a source of more than one legitimacy crisis that 
captivated the development of the EU in the past decades.
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Deliberative Democracy
Proponents of deliberative democracy argue that reason-giving for a particular po-
sition and deliberation between actors, beyond mere bargaining, allows normative 
interests and the empirical facts on which policy choices are based to be assessed 
and evaluated (Risse /Klein, 2007: 69). Deliberative democracy intends to enhance 
the legitimacy of modern governance by insisting on the creation of social and in-
stitutional conditions which enable participation of all those impacted by a certain 
policy, or their representatives, in the policy-making process (Ginsborg, 2008, 59). 
It does not coincide with some particular form of organization, but it represents a 
principle which stipulates what needs to be fulfilled in order for things in politics to 
be done fairly and justly (Eriksen/Fossum, 2000: 19). It presupposes that citizens 
are prepared to be moved by reasons that may conflict with their antecedent pre-
ferences and interests, and that those preferences and interests may change (Cohen, 
1997: 413). Furthermore, within deliberative procedures a government’s preferen-
ces are not treated as intrinsically legitimate expressions of domestic democratic 
processes, but must be justified against the principle of collective good (Nayer, 
2006: 788). Deliberative democracy as supplemental to representative democracy 
can greatly contribute to the processes of democratization. It can foster the feelings 
of belonging to a political community and identification with a political system. It 
can also provide representatives with much more information about the interests, at-
titudes and values of the citizens than can be deduced from elections alone. Finally, 
deliberation can improve both the objective and subjective information available 
to decision-makers necessary to improve the performance of the political system 
(Holzhacker, 2007: 262). 
According to numerous scholars, the principles of deliberative democracy, 
even though they are not explicitly mentioned in the treaties, are present in the ways 
policies are being made within the political system of the EU. That is, in a complex 
system of uninterrupted negotiations in a non-hierarchical setting (Eriksen, 2000: 
60, Grubiša, 2005: 64). Deliberative democracy within the political system of the 
EU has been developed most prominently within the comitology procedure, where-
by each year, in several hundred specialized committees, the Commission and vari-
ous member state experts assigned by the Council of Ministers discuss the Com-
mission’s legislative proposals. During these discussions, through interaction of 
various actors, the originally proposed legislation often gets significantly reshaped. 
Besides the comitology procedure, there are other procedures which greatly reflect 
deliberative principles. Good examples are the “trialogues” as part of the concilia-
tion process of the co-decision procedure. These are informal negotiations between 
representatives of the Commission, the Council of Ministers and the EP, which 
take place “behind the scenes” and often create conditions for formal acceptance of 
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certain legislative solutions at the formal meetings of the conciliation delegation. 
However, although promoting the deliberative concept of democracy, the evalua-
tion of “trialogues” from the perspective of democratic legitimacy is not always un-
ambiguous. Critics note that informal negotiations may increase gains in terms of 
efficiency, but that the goals of transparency and representation may be sacrificed 
in the process (Häge/Kaeding, 2007: 361). 
An additional example of promoting deliberative principles at the level of the 
EU can be found within the framework of the so-called Open Method of Coordi-
nation (OMC) as a new intergovernmental method of governance promoted in the 
ambit of the EU’s Lisbon Strategy. The OMC is based on voluntary cooperation of 
the member states in areas which fall under their competence. It rests on soft law 
mechanisms such as guidelines, indicators, benchmarking, sharing of best prac-
tice and peer review. As stipulated by the March 2000 European Council held in 
Lisbon, the OMC represents a process which can be divided into four phases (Eu-
ropean Council Presidency Conclusions, 23 and 24 March 2000). The first phase 
encompasses fixing guidelines for the Union combined with specific timetables for 
achieving the goals set in the short, medium and long terms. The second phase is fo-
cused on establishing, where appropriate, quantitative and qualitative indicators and 
benchmarks against the best practice in the world and tailored to the needs of differ-
ent member states and sectors. The third phase is about translating these European 
guidelines into national and regional policies by setting specific targets and adopt-
ing measures, taking into account national and regional differences. Finally, the 
fourth phase envisages periodic monitoring, evaluation and peer review organized 
as mutual learning processes. For Claudio Radaelli, the OMC as a theoretical con-
cept possesses strong deliberative qualities, materialized through prescribed consul-
tations with various social partners and civil society organizations (Radaelli, 2003: 
25). On the negative side, however, the author notes large discrepancies between the 
theoretical concept and its practical application, since in practice the OMC resulted 
in the emergence of only “narrow deliberative forums” usually reserved for partici-
pation by the experts (Radaelli, 2003: 49). 
The prevailing expert-focused deliberations within the political system of the 
EU motivated some authors to conclude that the EU should move from a relatively 
closed “exclusive” deliberation to a more “inclusive” type of deliberation, which 
would promote participation of a wide variety of actors (Auberger/Iskowski, 2007: 
272). Much in line with such considerations is the conclusion that, while having 
a highly developed “coordinative” sphere of discourse between levels of govern-
ment in the multi-level system, the EU has a much less developed “communicative” 
sphere with the broader public (Radaelli/Schmidt, 2004: 370). For Erik Oddvar 
Eriksen, a move in the direction of a “communicative sphere” would encourage the 
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EU to outgrow the currently dominant logic of “bargaining” as a focus of the de-
liberative process that encourages give-and-take logic, pork-barreling, log-rolling, 
etc. By outgrowing “bargaining”, the EU could fully embrace the logic of “arguing” 
within its deliberative processes that is marked by a change of views and by the way 
the discussion helps to mould preferences and to move standpoints. In such circum-
stances, the author notes, when strategic rational actors change their views, it is only 
to strike a better bargain as they are not moved by the force of the better argument, 
but by the outlook of success (Eriksen, 2000: 60). 
Conclusion
The Lisbon Treaty removed many uncertainties that previously burdened the demo-
cratic development of the EU. Through the coming to force of this treaty, the clas-
sic argument about the EU’s democratic deficit lost some of its appeal, because 
it transformed the EP from secondary to equal participant in the EU’s legislative 
process. Furthermore, the Lisbon Treaty clarified the position of the national par-
liaments which obtained significant control and influence powers over the EU’s 
legislative process. However, although showing exponential growth, representative 
democracy in the EU will never be as developed as it is at the national level due to 
the inexistence of a European demos, a common language community and a public 
sphere. That being said, the shortfalls of the EU’s democracy can to some extent be 
compensated through innovative democratic practice; for instance, through deve-
lopment of participatory, direct and deliberative democracy as concepts supplemen-
tal to the idea of representative democracy. 
Proponents of the European integration process for the past 20 years have been 
working on building up the EU’s profile with regard to participatory and delibera-
tive democracy. It can be concluded that, despite still present difficulties, they have 
largely succeeded in their efforts, since in many areas related to deliberative pro-
cesses and participation of civil society in policy-making, the EU has managed to 
set a golden standard and has become a showcase for the national democracies. The 
EU’s experiences related to participatory and deliberative democracy are of great 
importance for national democracies, because the traditional hierarchic character of 
the national political systems often breaches the spontaneous development of these 
supplemental democratic concepts at the national level. The implementation of di-
rect democracy within the EU’s political system has been detected as problematic, 
because it is not inscribed in the treaties and as such promotes imbalances between 
various member states, which ultimately can be viewed as an imbalance of rights 
between European citizens. Furthermore, direct democracy as a concept originally 
set for small communities encounters various implementation difficulties related 
to the EU’s own complexity and diversity. Therefore, in the interest of a harmoni-
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ous democratic development, future implementation of direct democracy within the 
political system of the EU should be subjected to some limitations and regulated in 
the treaties. 
As demonstrated, the EU combines elements of both traditional and innovative 
democratic practice. It is constrained to develop innovative democratic practice, ma-
terialized primarily through participatory and deliberative concepts of democracy, 
due primarily to limitations which it encounters in implementing representative de-
mocracy. Still, due to the fact that representative democracy stands as a cornerstone 
of each contemporary democratic system, its shortfalls can never be completely 
compensated through development of innovative democratic practice alone. From 
that perspective, the EU’s democratic deficit represents something like a chronic 
condition, which gets diminished with each new treaty revision, but whose com-
plete eradication is still not in sight. In other words, if the EU represents a “polity-
-in-the-making” (Shaw, 2000: 291), the criticism of its democratic legitimacy can 
be characterized as too harsh (Mény, 2009: 122), but not unfounded. In order for the 
EU to resolve problems with its democratic legitimacy, it will need to go beyond the 
institutional and procedural improvements analysed in this article. The steady im-
provements implemented in the last decades reduced some of its democratic deficit, 
but there is a limit on how much they can do and how far they can go. What the EU 
requires as the next step in its democratic development is politicisation of its com-
plex system of policy-making in the sense of creating alternative solutions to every 
conceivable issue. 
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